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ABSTRACT
DEFENSIVE PESSIMISM, STRATEGIC OPTIMISM, AND THE EFFECT OF OBSERVER 
EXPECTATIONS AND REFLECTIVITY ON TEST PERFORMANCE
Name: Brown, Christina Marie
University of Dayton
Advisor: Dr. C.E. Kimble
Defensive pessimists are people who have typically done well on evaluations in some 
domain in the past, yet they expect to do poorly on future evaluations and they worry about what 
might go wrong. These two components of defensive pessimism—low expectations and negative 
reflectivity—help reduce defensive pessimists’ pre-performance anxiety so they ultimately 
perform well. Strategic optimists are different from defensive pessimists in that they expect to do 
well in the future and they avoid thinking about what might happen, and they perform just as 
well as defensive pessimists. Defensive pessimists have been found to perform worse when 
another person says he or she expects them to do well, because this is inconsistent with their own 
expectations. This experiment was designed to test whether reflecting (i.e., thinking extensively) 
about an upcoming evaluation can counteract the negative effect of high expectations on 
defensive pessimists’ performance. The effect of low expectations on defensive pessimists’ 
performance, which has not been studied up to this point, was also examined. Ninety-six students 
at the University of Dayton who were classified as defensive pessimists or strategic optimists 
were told nothing about how they would do, or they were told that they were expected to do well 
or to do poorly. Half of all participants also wrote about their thoughts before taking an
iii
analytical test. The effect of high expectations hurting defensive pessimists’ performance was 
not replicated. It was found that low expectations tended to improve their performance, although 
this effect was not statistically significant. There was no main effect of pre-test reflection 
improving defensive pessimists’ test scores. In fact, in contrast to what other researchers have 
found, there was a slight tendency for defensive pessimists to perform worse after reflecting. 
Similarly, the behavior of strategic optimists also did not conform to previous findings, because 
they tended to score higher after reflecting. For strategic optimists, reflecting before the test 
improved their performance to the extent that it was able to reduce how often they thought about 
the difficulty of the test while the were actually taking the test.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The night before a test, you can find some students studying madly while fretting about 
what an awful grade they will get, other students studying madly but confident that they will pull 
it off, and still others who are not studying at all. People use different strategies to deal with 
evaluative situations like tests, and some of these strategies are healthier than others. Certain 
strategies motivate the individual to work harder so the evaluation will turn out well, while other 
strategies involve risking a poor evaluation as a way to keep the individual’s own thoughts and 
feelings about him- or herself positive. Not every person uses a strategy, and the type of strategy 
they choose often depends on the specific domain and their initial level of anxiety and
confidence.
However, for people who do use a strategy consistently, studying that strategy and how 
they use it can help us understand why certain strategies are beneficial and whether their 
effectiveness can extend to other situations. Defensive pessimism and self-handicapping are two 
strategies for dealing with evaluative situations that an individual is worried about. Strategic 
optimism is a third strategy for approaching evaluative situations, but it is used by people who do 
not feel stressed about the situation and need to prevent anxiety from developing.
Defensive pessimism and self-handicapping are different strategies than strategic 
optimism because they are both believed to be motivated by some kind of anxiety about the 
situation and one’s ability to do well or to avoid failure (Norem, 2001; Martin, Marsh, & Debus,
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2001a, 2001b, 2003; Oleson, Poehlmann, Yost, Lynch, & Arkin, 2000). Strategic optimists do 
not doubt their ability to do well, but they are still using a strategy in evaluative situations: In 
order to do well, they must avoid all thoughts about possible outcomes, particularly negative 
ones, because to think about the situation would produce anxiety where there was none 
previously (Norem & Illingworth, 1993). A person may use all three of these strategies in 
different areas of life, depending on the situation and whether they are confident or concerned 
about how they will do (Norem, 2001). For example, one person may self-handicap in school, 
while taking a strategically optimistic approach to sports and a defensively pessimistic approach 
to social situations. The focus of the present study is defensive pessimism, although some 
attention is given to strategic optimism—its opposite—because the two are usually studied 
simultaneously for comparison.
Defensive pessimism involves setting low expectations about the outcome and 
ruminating about negative possibilities of the situation (Norem, 2001). People who use defensive 
pessimism do so because they are anxious about how they will do, and expecting the worst and 
imagining what can go wrong helps motivate them to prepare (Norem & Cantor, 1986b). 
Defensive pessimists have done well in the past but continue to have low expectations because 
this strategy helps them do well in situations they are anxious about (Norem & Cantor, 1986b).
In contrast, strategic optimists have also done well in the past, but they do not feel anxious about 
future situations and are free to expect the best (Norem, 2001). While a defensive pessimist 
ruminates about the upcoming evaluation, a strategic optimist is carefree and prepares while 
avoiding thoughts about the outcome. Both defensive pessimists and strategic optimists perform 
well because defensive pessimists are anxious and their strategy motivates them to work harder,
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while strategic optimists’ strategy helps them avoid anxiety that would otherwise disrupt their 
performance (Norem, 2001; Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Spencer & Norem, 1996).
This study was designed to explore defensive pessimists’ rumination and how they 
respond to the expectations other people have for them. I was also interested in examining 
defensive pessimists’ tendency to think extensively about upcoming evaluations, and whether 
this extensive thinking might help them restore balance after an observer has tried to interfere 
with their strategy.
Defensive Pessimism and Other Strategies 
The first experiments on defensive pessimists (Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b)
compared them to people with similar histories of success but optimistic expectations, and the 
term “strategic optimism” was developed later to refer specifically to optimistic individuals who 
must also avoid thinking about the upcoming situation (Spencer & Norem, 1996). Most of the 
research has focused on defensive pessimists with strategic optimists as a secondary interest, 
although both groups are similar because they have done well in the past and continue to do well 
because of their respective strategies (Norem, 2001). Aside from strategic optimism, defensive 
pessimism has also been compared to depression and self-handicapping, so that literature will be 
discussed briefly.
Defensive Pessimism versus Strategic Optimism
The first published experiment on defensive pessimism and strategic optimism was by
Norem and Cantor (1986a). They sought to test the prediction that people holding strategically 
low expectations would not need to cognitively restructure a situation after failure, whereas 
people with optimistic expectations would use a “’post hoc’ strategy” (p. 350) by making ego­
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protecting attributions after failure. Optimists should deny having control over the event if they 
failed, but defensive pessimists should not display this attributional egotism because their low 
expectations should have already cushioned the blow of failure.
To test this, Norem and Cantor (1986a) prescreened participants for strategy type by 
asking them to rate the accuracy of eight statements about their behavior in academic situations, 
such as “I go into academic situations expecting the worst, even though I know I will probably 
do OK,” and “I often think about what it will be like if I do very well in an academic situation.” 
Their score was computed by subtracting their answers on the pessimistic items from their 
answers on the optimistic items. An additional statement, “I’ve generally done pretty well in 
academic situations in the past,” was included to identify defensive pessimists (as opposed to 
realistic pessimists or depressives) and realistic optimists (instead of illusory optimists) for 
participation in the experiment.
Prescreened defensive pessimists and optimists were asked to indicate how well they 
expected to do on an anagram task, completed the task, and received false success or failure 
feedback. Later they indicated how well they expected to do on a second anagram task, and then 
they completed the second task and answered a posttest questionnaire about their performance, 
their satisfaction with their performance, and their feelings of control over their performance. 
Participants’ expectations before the first and second task confirmed the accuracy of the 
optimism/pessimism prescreening, but the actual performance of optimists and defensive 
pessimists was not different. As predicted, optimists used a post hoc cushioning strategy by 
reporting less control after failure than after success. In contrast, defensive pessimists accepted 
control after both success and failure, and they reported feeling just as satisfied after success as 
the optimists did. Therefore, this initial work established the existence of the strategy of
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“defensive pessimism,” in which a person sets low expectations despite past success, and 
attributional egotism is unnecessary to cushion self-esteem in the event of failure.
To demonstrate that defensive pessimism is an effective strategy for the people who 
choose to use it, Norem and Cantor (1986b) interfered with the strategy and found that it affected 
the performance and attributions of defensive pessimists. Academic defensive pessimists and 
optimists were identified by selecting students’ whose scores on the questionnaire from the 
previous study (Norem & Cantor, 1986a) were in the upper and lower thirds, respectively. 
Defensive pessimists’ strategy was interfered with by having an encouragement condition, where 
the experimenter was informed of the participant’s GPA and told the participant that he or she 
would probably do well on an upcoming anagram task and should be confident, considering his 
or her GPA. They found that defensive pessimists in the encouragement condition performed 
significantly worse on the anagram task than defensive pessimists who did not receive 
encouragement (there were no differences between encouraged and nonencouraged optimists, 
nor nonencouraged optimists and nonecouraged defensive pessimists). In addition, for optimists 
and encouraged defensive pessimists, there was a positive correlation between participants’ 
perceptions of their own performance and how much control they felt they had over their 
performance. In other words, they would accept control for their results if they had done well, 
but they would deny it if they had done poorly. This correlation represents attributional egotism, 
which the first study by Norem and Cantor (1986a) found is not typically used by defensive 
pessimists. However, defensive pessimists displayed the same attributional egotism that 
optimists did when their strategy was disrupted by encouragement.
Setting low expectations is believed to help defensive pessimists feel less anxious, and 
the experimenter’s encouragement in the form of high expectations most likely undid the anxiety
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reduction because it made the defensive pessimists notice how their strategically low 
expectations were inconsistent with their past successes. As a consequence, these defensive 
pessimists performed worse and showed attributional egotism, suggesting that defensive 
pessimism—when the strategy is not interfered with—does indeed eliminate the need for ego­
protecting attributions because it cushions the individual in advance.
In discussing these findings, Norem and Cantor (1986b) theorized that defensive 
pessimism is an effective strategy for some people who are anxious because anxiety causes a 
person to have thoughts irrelevant to the task at hand, and the strategy helps bring the 
individual’s thoughts back to the task. Defensive pessimists have been considered an anomaly 
because earlier research has shown that low expectations become a self-fulfilling prophecy when 
they are stated explicitly (Campbell & Fairey, 1985; Dweck & Gilliard, 1975; Sherman, Skov, 
Hervitz, & Stock, 1981); yet for defensive pessimists, their strategy works because it helps them 
overcome their anxiety and motivates them to work harder. On the other hand, strategic optimists 
are not anxious about the situation so there is nothing affecting their motivation to prepare. 
Defensive Pessimism versus Depression and Self-Handicapping
It is important to recognize that defensive pessimism is a strategy and is distinct from 
dispositional pessimism and depression. For example, Showers and Ruben (1990) compared the 
expectations and anxiety of defensive pessimists and mildly depressed students two weeks 
before, one day before, and two weeks after a stressful event. The defensive pessimists and 
depressives were just as anxious before the event and had similar low expectations, but the 
defensive pessimists reported spending more time preparing for the event (in this case, having 
specific thoughts about the event was considered preparation). Defensive pessimists’ anxiety 
remained stable from two weeks before the event to one day before the event, while depressives’
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anxiety increased significantly the day before the event. In addition, while the defensive 
pessimists thought extensively about details before the event, only the depressed students 
continued to dwell on the situation two weeks after it had passed. Therefore, defensive 
pessimism, with its greater preparatory effort and less unhealthy rumination afterwards, is clearly 
different from depression, despite the low expectations and anxiety of people in both groups.
Defensive pessimism has also been compared to self-handicapping, which is when a 
person is uncertain about whether he or she will perform well and does not want others to 
interpret poor performance as a sign of inability, so he or she creates or claims obstacles that 
might prevent success (Berglas & Jones, 1978). As a result, failure can be blamed on these 
additional factors—such as alcohol or a lack of practice—instead of lack of ability (Berglas & 
Jones). Martin, Marsh, and Debus (2001a) conceptualized self-handicapping and defensive 
pessimism as both being essentially motivated by a desire to protect one’s self-worth from 
failure: self-handicappers do this by blaming failure on something outside of the self, and 
defensive pessimists prepare themselves for failure and lower their standards so failure won’t 
have the same impact. In addition, Martin, Marsh, and Debus sampled college students and 
found that a high level of uncertainty about how much control one has over avoiding failure was 
highly related to both self-handicapping and defensive pessimism.
While the two strategies seem to have similar motivational origins, they result in very 
different behaviors and outcomes. Self-handicappers risk failure by withdrawing effort or 
seeking situations where success is difficult, while defensive pessimists think through possible 
scenarios and increase their preparation. When directly comparing students using the two 
different strategies, self-handicappers have been found to do worse on exams and have lower 
GPAs in college (Elliot & Church, 2003), while defensive pessimists pass more of their courses
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(Eronen, Nurmi, & Salmela-Aro, 1998). In addition, adolescent defensive pessimists are 
observed as having more positive well-being, better school adjustment, and higher grades 
(Maatta, Stattin, & Nurmi, 2002). Defensive expectations and extensive thinking (reflectivity) 
have been examined separately, and defensive expectations have been found to lead to negative 
academic outcomes while reflectivity is associated with achievement (Martin, Marsh, & Debus, 
2001a, 2001b, 2003). Therefore, the extensive rumination before a situation seems to be the 
component of defensive pessimists’ strategy that is responsible for their success, because low 
expectations alone can be debilitating. In these same studies, self-handicapping and low 
expectations were related to similar feelings and outcomes, which adds further support to the 
view that defensive pessimism and self-handicapping—while similarly motivated—have very 
different outcomes because of the unique reflectivity component of defensive pessimism that 
leads to preparation and taking control of the situation.
Components of Defensive Pessimism
Although the initial work on defensive pessimism focused on low expectations as the 
essential characteristic of the strategy, further research has found that there are actually two 
components to defensive pessimism: low expectations and reflectivity (Norem, 2001). 
Reflectivity is the extensive thinking that defensive pessimists engage in before a stressful event, 
and it is also known as mental rehearsal. Defensive pessimists are more likely to reflect about 
both positive and negative possibilities than strategic optimists are (Norem, 2001), but negative 
reflectivity is more beneficial for defensive pessimists’ performance than positive reflectivity 
(Showers, 1992; Spencer & Norem, 1996). It is believed that the first component, low 
expectations, serves a self-protective goal because it prepares the individual to deal with failure;
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the second component, negative reflectivity, has a motivational purpose because imagining what 
can go wrong motivates the individual to prepare so these negative scenarios can be prevented 
(Showers, 1992; Showers & Ruben, 1990). One of the main purposes of the present experiment 
was to see if defensive pessimists’ tendency to reflect could be taken advantage of by 
encouraging reflectivity in a negative situation. Therefore, the focus will now be turned to the 
reflectivity component and the research that has already been done.
The Benefit of Reflecting
Showers (1992) used social defensive pessimists and social optimists to examine the 
effect of negative reflectivity. The theory was that imagining negative possibilities is beneficial 
for defensive pessimists because the imagined possibilities are so terrible that people are 
motivated to work harder so they won’t come true. Concrete, specific thoughts are more 
beneficial than general negativity because they provide material for creating a plan of action. 
Showers hypothesized that a negative focus of thoughts would help defensive pessimists feel 
better and perform well, although low expectations would not be necessary. Detailed negative 
thoughts alone should motivate the individual, while explicitly setting low expectations in the 
absence of reflecting could lead to expectancy confirmation. However, no differences were 
found between defensive pessimists who were or were not asked to state their expectations 
explicitly, so, in this case, defensive pessimists do not seem susceptible to expectancy 
confirmation (Showers, 1992, Study 1).
Showers (1992, Study 1) proceeded to test the effect of imagining possibilities with a 
positive or negative focus on defensive pessimists and optimists in social situations. Female 
introductory psychology college students who were prescreened for social defensive pessimism 
or optimism were told that the study would require them to spend ten minutes acquainting
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themselves with another participant, who was a female confederate. Before the conversation, 
participants were asked to rate the likelihood of twelve statements describing what might happen 
during the conversation, and the statements were either all positive or all negative possibilities. 
An example of a positive-focus statement is, “It is easy to talk to each other,” while a negative- 
focus statement would be, “There are long, awkward silences.” The actual conversation lasted 
five minutes and was videotaped, and both participants and confederates rated their opinions of 
the outcome and their impressions of their partner.
Defensive pessimists in the negative focus condition spent more time talking and 
received more favorable ratings from the confederates than positive-focus defensive pessimists, 
while focus had no effect on optimists. The explanation for this outcome was that imagining 
negative possibilities motivated the defensive pessimists to exert more effort into making the 
conversation turn out well; however, their extra effort seemed to drain them emotionally, 
because these participants also felt worse after the conversation.
Negative-focus defensive pessimists were also viewed by confederates as more friendly 
and comfortable, so a second study was conducted to examine how a negative focus helps 
defensive pessimists prepare. Showers (1992, Study 2) posited that the way defensive pessimists 
benefit from the negative thoughts may be similar to what happens in theories of reactance- 
helplessness and self-affirmation, which propose that people try to recover from unfavorable 
situations by acting or thinking in positive ways. Showers predicted that confronting negative 
possibilities causes defensive pessimists to react by having more positive thoughts and feelings 
as they try to emotionally and behaviorally prepare themselves. On the other hand, an initial 
positive focus is inconsistent with their typical strategy and this discrepancy may leave them 
even more aware of their anxiety and worries.
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After instructions and a focus manipulation that were identical to the previous study 
(Showers, 1992, Study 1), social defensive pessimists and optimists were asked to list all of the 
thoughts they had been having during a three-minute solitary wait. Participants were also asked 
to indicate their expectations and how much control they felt they would have over the situation, 
although the conversations ultimately never took place. Interestingly, defensive pessimists who 
had been asked to contemplate the likelihood of negative possibilities (negative focus condition) 
were in a more positive mood, felt more prepared and relaxed, wrote more positive thoughts 
about themselves, and had higher expectations about the conversation than defensive pessimists 
in the positive focus condition. There were no differences between optimists in the two focus 
conditions. Ironically, defensive pessimists’ strategy of thinking through negative possibilities 
appears to leave them feeling more prepared and emotionally ready for the stressful event. If 
defensive pessimists are forced to think in a way that is inconsistent with their strategy (positive 
focus condition), then they will continue to feel anxious and unprepared. Therefore, even though 
their initial thoughts and expectations are negative, defensive pessimists may enter the stressful 
situation feeling more positive and prepared because their strategy has reduced their anxiety.
The importance of reflectivity for defensive pessimists was also demonstrated by two 
studies by Norem and Illingworth (1993), although they addressed reflectivity in general instead 
of negative reflectivity in particular. In Norem and Illingworth’s first study, reflectivity was 
manipulated by having participants in a thought-listing condition complete a questionnaire that 
asked them to consider things like the best and worst possible outcomes and how they might feel 
given such outcomes. On the other hand, participants in a distraction condition performed an 
irrelevant manual task. Participants were told they would be listing their thoughts or working on 
the irrelevant task, their mood was assessed, and then they actually listed their thoughts or
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performed the task. Next, their anxiety was measured, they performed a mental arithmetic task 
that they believed was the focus of the experiment, and finally they completed a posttest 
questionnaire that included items such as their perception of their performance and how much 
control they felt they had over their performance.
After being told that they would have to write out their thoughts or perform a different 
task before the main one, defensive pessimists in the distraction condition were in a significantly 
more negative mood than defensive pessimists in the thought-listing condition, while the 
opposite was true for optimists in the thought-listing condition compared to optimists in the 
distraction condition. Therefore, people seem to be aware of their own strategies to some degree, 
because they feel worse when they anticipate having to do something that is inconsistent with 
their own strategy. Defensive pessimists and optimists also performed better on the mental 
arithmetic task when they were in the condition that matched their strategy, although these 
differences were not statistically significant. However, performance on mental arithmetic 
problems may be determined more by ability than anxiety, so perhaps the differences would have 
been statistically significant if the task was different. For this reason, the type of performance 
task that was used in the current study was carefully considered.
Although actual performance was not significantly different, defensive pessimists felt 
better about their performance and felt they had more control over their performance after the 
thought-listing task than after the distraction task. Optimists, on the other hand, felt worse about 
their performance and were less satisfied after the thought-listing task than the distraction task. 
For defensive pessimists, it seems that reflectivity functions by controlling their anxiety so it 
doesn’t disrupt their performance. Not only were defensive pessimists less anxious in the 
thought-listing condition, but the interaction between condition and strategy disappeared when
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anxiety was a covariate, which suggests that the reduction in anxiety is indeed responsible for 
defensive pessimists’ improved performance after reflectivity.
In their second study, Norem and Illingworth (1993) used an experience-sampling 
methodology and had defensively pessimistic or optimistic nursing students routinely reflect on 
their progress towards their goals. Consistent with the laboratory studies, the defensive 
pessimists felt better when they had to make routine progress reports that required them to 
reflect, while the optimists felt better when they did not have to make such reports. The results of 
these two studies support the theory that reflectivity, in particular, is an essential part of 
defensive pessimists’ strategy. As they put it, “this thinking-through process functions as a way 
for them to acknowledge their apprehensions and negativity and then cognitively work through 
it,” so the “defensive pessimists feel better, feel less anxious and more in control, and their 
performance should thus be less likely to be disrupted by anxiety” (p. 823). Norem and 
Illingworth were also the first to propose that not thinking about possibilities for an upcoming 
stressful situation is an essential part of the optimists’ strategy, because they do not feel anxious 
and any type of reflectivity could create anxiety that they might have been denying or 
discounting before.
This prediction was supported by their study and another experiment by Spencer and 
Norem (1996), who had recreational defensive pessimists and optimists engage in a dart­
throwing task after listening to guided imagery tapes. Defensive pessimists performed best after 
a coping imagery tape that described mistakes and imagined ways to correct them (which is 
similar to their natural negative reflectivity), while optimists performed best after a relaxation 
condition (which did not describe the task at all). Optimists performed the same in a mastery 
condition (imagining a perfect performance) as they did in the coping condition, so the evidence
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does suggest that strategic optimism is not simply the opposite of defensive pessimism—having 
high expectations and imagining positive possibilities—but actually involves avoiding reflection 
or distracting oneself before an evaluation.
Reflectivity As Prefactual Thought
Research has also been done on the prefactual and counterfactual thoughts—mental 
simulations before and after an event, respectively—of defensive pessimists and optimists. Both 
prefactual and counterfactual thoughts are simulations about possible alternative outcomes, so 
prefactual thinking is essentially a form of reflectivity (Sanna, 1996). According to Sanna, the 
type of prefactual thinking that is similar to defensive pessimists’ negative reflectivity is known 
as upward prefactuals, which are thoughts that consider how the possible outcome could be 
better. Upward counterfactuals are thoughts about how the actual outcome might have been 
better, while downward prefactuals and counterfactuals have to do with how the possible or real 
outcome could be worse. Sanna (1996, Study 1, Study 2) found that defensive pessimists were 
more likely to make upward prefactuals before an evaluation—which may motivate an individual 
to prepare because they focus on how the situation could be better—while optimists are more 
likely to make downward counterfactuals after an evaluation—which produces positive affect 
because it is comforting that it “could have been worse.” Although prefactual thoughts are 
different than thinking through possible outcomes (reflectivity) and counterfactual thoughts are 
not identical to post hoc attributions about personal control, they are used similarly by defensive 
pessimists and optimists: Defensive pessimists will think more negatively about a situation 
beforehand so they are emotionally prepared if it doesn’t go well, while optimists wait until the 
situation is over and make comforting attributions or counterfactuals if the outcome was
unpleasant.
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Reflectivity and Negative Moods
Similar to Showers’ (1992) and Spencer and Norem’s (1996) findings that defensive 
pessimists perform better in conditions with a negative focus, Sanna (1998, Study 1 and Study 2) 
found that defensive pessimists performed better on anagram tasks when they were induced to be 
in a negative mood than a positive mood. However, all individuals generate more upward 
prefactuals when they are in a negative mood, so a negative mood must have helped defensive 
pessimists’ performance because it led to more upward prefactuals. In fact, the number of 
upward prefactuals—essentially, the amount of negative reflectivity—was positively related to 
defensive pessimists’ performance. In addition, the relationship between defensive pessimists’ 
upward prefactual thoughts and their performance was found not only when participants were 
prompted specifically for their prefactual thoughts (Study 1), but even when they were simply 
asked to write about their performance on the upcoming anagram task (Study 3). Optimists also 
generated more upward prefactuals when they were induced to be in a negative mood, but this 
was negatively related to their performance in that condition (Study 1). When they were not 
specifically prompted for their prefactual thoughts but had to write about their performance
spontaneously, optimists’ natural approach was to report little prefactual thinking at all (Study 
3). However, when defensive pessimists are prompted for downward prefactuals (positive 
reflectivity) or prevented from engaging in any prefactual thought by occupying them with a 
distraction task, their performance on a subsequent anagram task suffers (Sanna, 1996, Study 2).
The research by Showers (1992), Norem and Illingworth (1993), Spencer and Norem 
(1996), and Sanna (1996, 1998) are strong support for the view that reflectivity helps defensive 
pessimists, most likely because it reduces their anxiety; distraction, on the other hand, helps 
strategic optimists because it avoids bringing attention to potential anxiety. One issue that has
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been addressed only briefly in past research is whether reflectivity helps reduce defensive
pessimists’ anxiety because it gives them a sense of control over the situation. Norem (2001) 
believes that defensive pessimists feel that they have more control because of their low 
expectations and reflectivity, and both Norem and Cantor (1986b, Study 2) and Norem and 
Illingworth (1993, Study 1) found that defensive pessimists did report feeling more in control, 
according to posttest questionnaires, after reflecting or in conditions where their strategy had not 
been disrupted. The theory is that defensive pessimists feel they have little control over a 
stressful situation and they believe their strategy will help them have more control (Showers & 
Ruben, 1990). Whether reflectivity, in particular, can help them regain control when their 
strategy has already been interfered with was of interest in the present study.
Overview of the Present Study
One of the first discoveries about defensive pessimists was that their performance suffers 
when someone else reports having high expectations for them (Norem & Cantor, 1986b). This 
performance impairment may be because the high expectations are inconsistent with their own 
low expectations (Norem & Cantor, 1986b). Their strategy is disrupted—which subsequently 
affects their performance—because the inconsistency caused by the experimenter’s verbal 
encouragement is believed to “undo” the anxiety reduction achieved by strategically setting low 
expectations (Norem & Cantor, 1986b). If another person’s high expectations cause anxiety 
because they don’t match the defensive pessimist’s own expectations, then perhaps giving a 
defensive pessimist time to reflect—the other component of their strategy that helps reduce 
anxiety—can restore the imbalance caused by an observer’s expectations. There is support for 
the proposal that thinking through possible outcomes, particularly negative ones, is the part of
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defensive pessimists’ strategy that provides the most positive benefits (Martin, Marsh, & Debus, 
2001; Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Showers, 1992; Spencer & Norem, 1996), but it has not yet 
been studied whether interference with one part of their strategy (low expectations) can be fixed 
by emphasizing the other, and perhaps more important, part of their strategy (reflectivity).
If encouragement by an experimenter disrupts defensive pessimists’ strategy because it is 
inconsistent with their own low expectations (Norem & Cantor, 1986b), then should defensive 
pessimists be unaffected by someone else agreeing with the low expectations they hold for 
themselves? The initial work on defensive pessimism was motivated in part by the anomaly of 
people who could explicitly set low expectations yet still perform well (Norem & Cantor,
1986b). Past research has shown that when low expectations are explicitly, publicly, or verbally 
stated, an individual’s performance is ultimately impaired (Campbell & Fairey, 1985; Dweck & 
Gilliard, 1975; Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, & Stock, 1981). For example, Sherman et al. had 
participants think about reasons for positive or negative outcomes, but it was when participants 
explicitly set low expectations for themselves that they performed worse—considering negative 
possibilities alone was not harmful. However, Norem and Cantor (1986b, p. 1215) also suggest 
that defensive pessimists may be somewhat aware of how they “trick” themselves into working 
harder by having pessimistic expectations. If defensive pessimists are aware of this at some level, 
perhaps the reason they aren’t harmed by explicitly setting low expectations is because they 
privately know they are expecting the worst for their own benefit. They might secretly know they 
will do well as long as they continue overtly expecting that they won’t. On the other hand, if 
another person agrees with their low expectations, this might undermine the secret security they 
have. Explicitly setting low expectations for themselves doesn’t hurt them because they realize it 
is part of their strategy, but another person’s expectations may seem more realistic because the
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defensive pessimists might know they are only tricking themselves with their own expectations. 
In this case, low expectations that are explicitly set by an observer may have the same effect on 
defensive pessimists that personally stating low expectations has on most other people. That is, 
defensive pessimists do well when they set low expectations for themselves, while non-defensive 
pessimists do poorly when they have low expectations. It is possible that defensive pessimists 
may not retain this immunity from low expectations if an observer is the person stating those 
expectations.
In the present study, defensive pessimists interacted with an experimenter who verbally 
announced having either high or low expectations for the defensive pessimist. Half of each of 
these participants were then given the opportunity to reflect before the task so it could be 
determined if reflectivity restored any imbalance caused by the observer’s expectations. When 
their expectations had been interfered with, perhaps emphasizing the other component of their 
strategy could cancel these disruptive effects. That is, the reflectivity component of their strategy 
is believed to be the part that provides the most obvious benefit—negative expectations alone are 
ineffective—so perhaps defensive pessimists can do well as long as they have plenty of time to 
reflect. The predictions were as follows:
1) Consistent with past research (Norem & Cantor, 1986b), defensive pessimists in the High
Expectations condition should perform worse than defensive pessimists in the control
condition.
2) Reflecting before the task and after hearing the observer’s expectations is hypothesized to 
result in more positive performance than having no opportunity to reflect.
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3) Reflectivity should “undo” the effect of an observer’s expectations; therefore, defensive 
pessimists in the High Expectations condition should perform better in the Reflection
condition than in the No Reflection condition.
No specific predictions were made as to how the Low Expectations condition would 
differ from the control group, because it was possible that low expectations could either hurt 
performance or have no effect.
A control group of strategic optimists was also included in this study to evaluate the 
reflectivity manipulation. In order to test the hypothesis that reflectivity would undo the negative 
effect of high expectations, the reflectivity manipulation must be able to improve defensive 
pessimists’ performance as it has been shown to do in other studies (e.g., Spencer & Norem, 
1996). Reflecting is supposed to help defensive pessimists’ perform well while causing strategic 
optimists to perform worse. Before testing whether reflecting overrides the effect of high 
expectations on defensive pessimists, the reflectivity manipulation in this study must achieve the 
same effect on both defensive pessimists and strategic optimists that has been observed by other 
researchers. Therefore, a control group of strategic optimists who were only exposed to the 
reflectivity manipulation (there was no manipulation of observer expectancy) was included. The 
prediction for this group were follows:
1) Strategic optimists will perform better on the test when they do not reflect beforehand.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
A total of 656 undergraduate psychology students at the University of Dayton completed 
the Revised Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire (Norem, 2001) in a packet of psychological 
surveys distributed during a mass group testing session, for which the students received course 
research credit. Students who were classified as defensive pessimists (DPs) or strategic optimists 
(SOs), based on their scores on the measure described below, were contacted to participate in the 
experiment. This led to a total of 60 DPs and 36 SOs who participated in the experiment. Of this 
total, 80% of the defensive pessimists and 55% of the strategic optimists were female. Prior 
research on defensive pessimists’ and strategic optimists’ behavior has consistently found no 
gender differences (Sanna, 1996), so the disproportionate number of females is not a concern.
Measures
The Revised Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire. The Revised Defensive Pessimism 
Questionnaire (R-DPQ; Norem, 2001; see Appendix A) measures the two components of 
defensive pessimism: defensive expectations and reflectivity. The instructions for the 
questionnaire can be adapted for use in different domains, and academics was the domain of 
interest in this study. The questionnaire instructed participants to “think about how you prepare 
for and think about academic situations” when answering the questions designed to measure
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pessimistic expectations and reflectivity. In the version of the scale used in this study, 
participants were asked to rate on a scale of 1 (not at all true of me) to 5 (very true of me) how
true the items were of them in academic situations.
The overall defensive pessimism score was calculated by summing the four pessimistic 
expectations items and eight reflectivity items. Previous research has defined defensive 
pessimists as those whose scores fall in the upper third of the distribution, while strategic 
optimists are those with scores in the lower third (Norem, 2001). However, the upper fourth and 
lower fourth of the distribution were used in this study in hopes that the stricter criteria would 
mean that the students who fit the criteria would truly be DPs and SOs instead of simply having a 
tendency towards a particular strategy.
A thirteenth item on the R-DPQ asks students the veracity of the statement, “I’ve 
generally done pretty well in academic situations in the past.” In previous research, only students 
who answer at least a 4 (on a 5-point scale, with 5 representing “very true of me”) or who meet a 
minimum GPA are classified as DPs or SOs in order to separate them from realistic pessimists 
and illusory optimists. For this purpose, participants were also asked to select the range that their 
college GPA (or high school if it was their first semester) fell under: (a) 3.5 and above; (b) 3.0- 
3.49; (c) 2.5-2.99; (d) 2.0-2.49; (e) 1.99 and below. Only students with a GPA of 3.0 or higher 
could be classified as DPs or SOs. It was also necessary that participants had high GPAs so the 
experimenter’s encouragement in the High Expectancy condition would be appropriate.
Past research (Norem, 2001) has demonstrated that the R-DPQ has a high reliability, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .78, with an average reliability of .74 for the separate Reflectivity and 
Pessimism subscales. Defensive pessimism is a domain-specific strategy, and the scale has been 
used to classify defensive pessimists in other areas by changing the wording of the instructions
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from “academic” to “social,” “recreational,” or another appropriate domain (Showers, 1988, 
1992; Spencer, 1993; Spencer & Norem, 1996). Academic defensive pessimism was selected for 
this study due to the nature of the experimental task, the centrality of academics in college 
students’ lives, and the strong empirical support for the use of defensive pessimism, strategic 
optimism, and self-handicapping as strategies in academic environments (Martin, Marsh, and 
Debus, 2001a; Martin, Marsh, Williamson, and Debus, 2003).
Selection of Defensive Pessimists and Strategic Optimists
Separate mass testing sessions (during which the R-DPQ was administered) were held in
the Fall and Winter semesters, but the cut-off points for the upper fourth and lower fourth of the 
distribution were identical both semesters. Participants’ R-DPQ scores ranged from 13 to 57, 
with 42 and above as the upper quartile and 33 and below as the bottom quartile for both 
semesters. Therefore, students were classified as DPs if their R-DPQ score was 42 or above, they 
rated an agreement of 4 or 5 to the statement, “I’ve generally done pretty well in academic 
situations in the past,” and they reported having a GPA of 3.0 or higher. Students were classified 
as SOs if their R-DPQ score was 33 or below, they responded 4 or 5 to the past success 
statement, and they also had a GPA of 3.0 or higher.
Procedure
Students who fit the criteria for defensive pessimism or strategic optimism were 
contacted and invited to participate in the individual experimental sessions. The experimenter 
began by having the participant read and sign a paper indicating his or her informed consent. 
Next the participant completed a background questionnaire about his or her year in college,
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academic major, and high school or college GPA. Except for this background questionnaire 
(which was on a slip of paper), a computer was used for participants to respond to survey items, 
to type out their thoughts if they were in the reflectivity condition, and to take the actual test. The 
experimenter told all participants the same initial description of the experiment:
“The research we’re doing today is about test-taking strategies and how they relate to actual 
performance. We’re also interested in how you feel about your own strategies, so you’ll be 
answering some personal questions before and after you take the test. The test you’ll be taking
used to be one of three sections in a standardized test called the Graduate Record Examination, or
the GRE for short. This test is normally used to evaluate students who are about to graduate from 
college with their Bachelor’s degree and are applying to other universities to get a higher degree. 
As I’m sure you remember, the SATs were an important part of your college application and 
schools put a lot of emphasis on them. The GRE is just like the SATs in that it’s a standardized 
test students take when they’re applying to universities. However, the SATs are used for people 
going from high school to college, while the GRE is for students who are finishing their first 4 
years of college and are applying to graduate schools. The test you’ll be taking today is from an 
old GRE exam, and your score on this test would be a good indicator of how well you’d do on the
GRE.”
Next, the experimenter handed the participant a piece of paper with a practice problem on 
it (see Appendix B) and said, “I have a sample problem that I’d like you to read through so you 
have an idea of what the test will be like. Don’t attempt to solve it, just read through it for now.”
Observer-expectancy manipulation. There were three expectancy conditions: High 
Expectancy, Low Expectancy, and Control Expectancy. The High Expectancy condition was 
designed to be analogous to the Encouragement condition by Norem and Cantor (1986b). As the 
participant handed the practice problem back to the experimenter, the experimenter in the High 
Expectancy condition said, “The problem you just read probably seems a little hard... But, based
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on your GPA, you should feel pretty confident about the test. I’m sure you’ll do just fine, and 
probably even score on the high side.”
In the Low Expectancy condition, the experimenter said, “The problem you just read 
probably seems a little hard. The test is pretty hard, and most people don’t take it until their 
senior year in college. Since you’re still in your X year, I think the test will probably seem 
difficult to you and your score might be a bit lower than that of most of the people who take it.” 
The majority of participants were in their first (66.7%), second (25%), or third (3.1%) year. 
However, if the participant happened to be a senior (5.2%), the statement of Low Expectations 
was changed to, “The test is pretty hard, and most people begin studying an average of two or 
three months before they take the test. Since you haven’t had any practice with these types of 
problems before, I think the test will probably seem difficult to you and your score might be a bit 
lower than that of most of the people who take it.”
In the control group, the experimenter was silent as the participant returned the practice 
problem. After the expectancy manipulations, the experimenter gave the participant scratch 
paper to use during the test.
Reflectivity manipulation. In the No Reflection condition, participants went straight to the 
pretest questions by clicking a “Continue” button on the computer. In the Reflection condition, 
participants were told to spend five minutes typing out all of their thoughts about the test before 
taking the test. The experimenter elaborated, “For example, consider: How might you feel as 
you’re taking the test? What do you think will happen during the test? How would you feel if 
you did poorly? And what is the worst possible outcome?” The experimenter explained that the 
computer would automatically submit their responses after five minutes, and then they would be 
asked a few general questions (the pretest measures) about how they were feeling. Following the
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pretest questions, all participants (both Reflection and No Reflection) were told that before they 
clicked a continue button that would start the test, they were supposed to press down on an 
intercom button inside of the room (this was the signal to the experimenter—who was waiting in 
another room connected to the intercom—to start the 25-minute timer for the test).
The instructions in the Reflection condition were similar to the thought-listing 
questionnaire used by Norem and Illingworth (1993). Spencer and Norem (1996) found that both 
reflection and a negative valence to the reflection were important for DPs to perform well, so the 
instructions were somewhat negative in focus. Participants typed their thoughts directly into a 
box on the computer screen, with these instructions above the box:
For the next five minutes, please type out all your thoughts about the test you are about to 
take. For example, consider: How might you feel as you ’re taking the test? What do you think will 
happen during the test? How would you feel if you did poorly? What is the worst possible
outcome?
(Don't worry about grammar or using complete sentences, but focus on the content of your
thoughts.)
A sentence below the box reminded participants that their responses would be submitted
automatically after 5 minutes.
Pretest measures. Before taking the test, all participants were asked to select a point on 
each of three 7-point scales to indicate how they were currently feeling: “How anxious do you 
feel about the upcoming test?” (1 Not at all anxious to 7 Very anxious), “How well do you 
expect to do on the test?” (1 Poorly to 7 Very welt), and “How much control do you feel you 
have over the outcome of the test?” (1 No control at all to 7 Complete control).
Performance measure. The test consisted of 25 questions from the analytic section of a 
GRE practice test published by the Princeton Review (2001; see Appendix C). Analytical
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questions were chosen instead of verbal or math questions to avoid extreme scores caused by 
students with very high or very low vocabularies or math abilities. In addition, differences in 
students’ performance on difficult verbal or math questions would probably be a function of 
ability more than state anxiety, whereas the analytical games require concentration and close 
attention to details. Anxiety is believed to impair performance because it takes attention away 
from the task (Norem & Cantor, 1986b), so there should be more room for variability in 
participants’ performance on these types of questions if their personality/strategy type is 
presumed to cause some students to feel more anxious after certain experimental manipulations. 
Other experiments have used anagram tasks (Norem & Cantor, 1986a, 1986b; Sanna, 1996, 
1998), tracing tasks (Norem & Cantor, 1986b), and arithmetic problems (Norem & Illingworth, 
1993) as performance measures when studying academic defensive pessimism. These analytical 
questions from the GRE were chosen because they seem more relevant to academia and 
performance on them should be equally affected by anxiety.
The instructions above the test read, “Please select the best answer for each question. You 
may use scratch paper to help you solve the problem. Your answers will be submitted 
automatically after 25 minutes.” When 25 minutes had passed, the experimenter came into the 
room and clicked a button on the computer to submit the test and open the posttest questions.
The experimenter instructed participants to complete these questions and then to open the door to 
the hallway (where the experimenter would be waiting) when they were done.
Posttest measures. Participants were asked to indicate their answers to the following 
questions on 7-point scales: (1) How anxious were you while you were taking the test? (1 Not at 
all anxious to 7 Very anxious); (2) How relaxed were you during the test? (1 Very relaxed to 7 
Very tense); (3) How often did you find yourself thinking about how difficult the test was while
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you were taking the test? (1 Never to 7 Very often)', (4) How often did you find yourself thinking 
about how well you were doing while you were taking the test? (1 Never to 7 Very often)', (5) 
How often did you find yourself thinking about what your score would be while you were taking 
the test? (1 Never to 7 Very often)', (6) How often did you think about things unrelated to the test 
while you were taking it? (1 Never to 7 Very often)', (7) How satisfied are you with how much 
preparation you had before the test? (1 Not at all satisfied to 7 Very satisfied.)
After participants submitted their responses and opened the door, they were given a 
debriefing paper that described the purpose of the experiment in detail, explained the expectancy 
and reflectivity manipulations, and assured them of the confidentiality of their data. The 
experimenter made sure every participant’s questions were answered, and then casually asked 
each participant at the end of the study if one of the two strategies described in the debriefing 
form (defensive pessimism or strategic optimism) seemed to describe the participant more than 
the other strategy. The experimenter made a note of the participant’s response. All participants 
were then thanked and given research credit.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The data of three DPs and one SO were deleted from all analyses. The experimenter 
forgot to give scratch paper to two of the DPs, which may have reduced their scores on the test. 
The third DP whose data was deleted was not a native English speaker and thus was at an unfair 
disadvantage with the wordy analytical problems, as suggested by her score of 0% correct. One 
SO’s data was deleted because there was a computer malfunction and she typed her thoughts for 
nine minutes instead of five. This led to a total of 57 DPs (N was 10 for all conditions, except for 
8 in High Expectancy-Reflection and 9 in Low Expectancy-Reflection) and 35 SOs (17 in the 
Reflection condition and 18 in the No Reflection condition).
Manipulation Check: Strategy Classification
A one-way ANOVA of strategy type (DP or SO) on participants’ responses to the 
question “How well do you expect to do on the test?” was not significant. However, this could be 
because DPs’ expectations were influenced by which expectancy condition they were in. A one­
way ANOVA of expectancy condition on DPs’ pretest expectations found this effect to be only 
marginally significant F(2, 54) = 2.62, p = .082 (High Expectancy M = 3.83, SD = 0.92; Low 
Expectancy M= 3.05, SD = 0.97; Control M= 3.40, SD = 1.19).
Although DPs, on average, did not report significantly lower expectations than SOs, the 
content of participants’ reflections suggests that the classification of students as DPs or SOs was 
successful. Each statement written by participants in the Reflection condition was categorized
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based on its content (e.g., negative thought, positive thought, random thought, etc.). The method
used to code the reflections will be described in more detail later. Of the total number of
statements written, a greater percentage of DPs’ statements were negative (Af= 42.92, SD = 
22.22), compared to the percentage of negative statements by SOs (M= 25.05, SD = 24.76). This 
difference is statistically significant, F(l, 42) = 6.18,/? = .017. Because statements could be 
positive, negative, neutral, random/unrelated, etc., the percentage of positive statements out of 
the total number of statements is not simply the remainder when the percentage of negative 
statements is subtracted from 100. Therefore, a one-way ANOVA of strategy type on the 
percentage of positive statements was also performed. SOs had a higher proportion of positive 
statements in their reflections (M= 41.56, SD = 24.01) than DPs did (M- 23.68, SD = 17.18),
and this was also significant, F(i, 42) = 8.29,/? = .006.
Considering that DPs are supposed to reflect negatively before evaluative situations while
SOs are not (Norem, 2001), these results suggest that the classification of participants as DPs or 
SOs was successful. Most of the subsequent analyses were conducted separately for DPs and 
SOs because they were subject to a different set of independent variables (both expectancy and 
reflectivity for DPs, only reflectivity for SOs). However, attention will be given first to an 
analysis involving both strategy types and the reflectivity manipulation, because this 
manipulation was consistent across both groups.
The Interaction of Strategy Type and Reflectivity on Test Performance
Past research has shown that DPs benefit from reflecting beforehand while SOs perform
worse under this condition. To test this, a 2 x 2 ANOVA of strategy type by reflectivity 
condition on the percentage of correct answers was conducted. Only DPs in the Control
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Expectancy condition were included in this analysis because all SOs were in the Control 
Expectancy condition. There was no main effect of strategy type on percentage correct, F(l, 51) 
= .007, p = .932, meaning DPs and SOs performed equally well on the test. There was also no 
effect of reflectivity condition on percentage correct, F(l, 51) = .004, p = .951. The main 
interest, however, was the interaction between strategy type and reflectivity condition, because it 
was expected that the effect of reflectivity would depend on participants’ strategy type. The 
interaction was not significant, F(l, 51) = 1.883,/? = .176. Although the interaction did not reach 
significance, the means were actually opposite of the direction predicted: DPs performed better 
in the No Reflection condition (M = 68.11, SD = 24.70) than in the Reflection condition (M = 
59.04, SD = 22.55), while SOs did better under Reflection (M= 68.26, SD = 22.49) than No 
Reflection (Af = 59.98, SD = 21.42). This peculiar finding is illustrated in Figure 1.
Strategy Type
I loefensive Pessimists 
[%/lStrateqic Optimists
Reflectivity Condition
Figure 1: The average percentage of correct answers on the test by strategy type and reflectivity
condition.
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Defensive Pessimists
Main Analysis: Reflectivity and Expectancy on Test Performance
The main analysis was a 3 x 2 ANOVA of observer expectations (High, Low, Control),
reflectivity (Reflection, No Reflection), and their interaction on DPs’ percentage of correct 
answers on the test. The following simple comparisons were planned: Between the Low 
Expectancy group and the Control Expectancy group in the No Reflection condition (because the 
effect of an observer stating low expectations for a DP’s performance is an unexplored question; 
the No Reflection condition was chosen because it can be considered the control group of the 
reflectivity manipulation), between High Expectancy and Control Expectancy in the No 
Reflection condition (to see if Norem and Cantor’s 1986b effect was replicated), and between 
Reflection and No Reflection in the High Expectancy condition (to test the hypothesis that 
reflection can undo the negative effect of high expectations).
Table 1
Defensive Pessimists ’ Mean Percentage of Correct Answers by Expectancy and Reflectivity Condition
Reflectivity
Expectancy
High Low Control
Reflection 67.7 61.66 59.04
(16.67) (20.42) (22.55)
No Reflection 63.61 73.14 68.11
(16.16) (15.06) (24.70)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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The means and standard deviations of the percentage of correct answers by reflectivity 
and expectancy condition are presented in Table 1. The 3><2 ANOVA found that there was no 
main effect of reflectivity, F(l, 51) = 1.10,/? = .299, nor expectancy, F(2, 51) = 0.19,/ = .832. 
The interaction of reflectivity and expectancy was also not significant, F(2, 51) = 0.83,/ = .443. 
A graph of percentage correct by condition can be seen in Figure 2.
Reflectivity Condition
Figure 2: Defensive pessimists’ average percentage of correct answers by reflectivity and expectancy
conditions.
Although the main analysis was not significant, the planned comparisons were still
performed to test the hypotheses.
1) It was expected that DPs in the High Expectations condition would perform worse than 
DPs in the control condition. In the No Reflection (reflectivity control) condition, defensive 
pessimists exposed to high expectations did worse (M= 63.61, SD = 16.16) than the control
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group (M= 68.11, SD = 24.70), consistent with Norem and Cantor’s (1986b) original finding. 
However, the planned comparison between these two groups found that this difference was not 
significant, F(1, 51) = 0.26, p = .611. Therefore, the effect found by Norem and Cantor (1986b) 
was not replicated.
2) It was hypothesized that DPs would perform better when they reflected before the test. 
As revealed by the main analysis (described previously), there was no main effect of reflectivity 
condition on DPs’ performance, 7?(l,51)=1.10,/? = .299.
3) Because it was thought that reflecting would “undo” the negative effect of an 
observer’s high expectations (although this negative effect was actually not found, as shown by 
the test of the first hypothesis), DPs in the High Expectancy-Reflection condition were expected 
to perform better than DPs in the High Expectancy-No Reflection condition. Because it was 
hypothesized that reflection would improve defensive pessimists’ performance after high 
expectations, this should also mean that their performance would become equal to that of the 
Control Expectancy group. Although the effect of high expectations hindering performance was 
not replicated, the analyses were continued with the planned comparison of the Reflection and 
No Reflection conditions under High Expectancy. While performance after high expectations 
was better in the reflection condition (Reflection M = 67.70, SD = 16.67; No Reflection M = 
63.61, SD = 16.15), this difference was not significant, F(l, 51) = 0.19,/? = .663. Along these 
same lines, it was predicted that High Expectancy-No Reflection would reduce performance 
compared to Control-No Reflection, and that reflecting after high expectations would raise DPs’ 
scores enough to be comparable to those in the Control-No Reflection condition. While the 
reduction in performance under High Expectancy-No Reflection did not reach statistical
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significance, it is of interest to note that the average High Expectancy-Reflection score (M= 
67.70) is nearly identical to the average Control-No Reflection score (M= 68.11).
4) No specific predictions were made as to how the Low Expectations condition would 
differ from the control group, so this analysis was exploratory. In the No Reflection condition, 
the percentage of correct answers in the Low Expectancy condition was not significantly 
different from the Control condition, F(l, 51) = 0.33,p = .570. On average, however, 
participants did better in the Low Expectancy condition than the Control condition (see Table 1).
Linear Regression to Predict Percentage Correct
Because the manipulations could not explain defensive pessimists’ performance on the 
test, a stepwise linear regression was conducted to see if any of the three pretest measures, the 
seven posttest measures, gender, or GPA could predict the percentage of correct answers. 
Responses to two of the posttest questions entered the prediction equation: “How often did you 
find yourself thinking about how difficult the test was while you were taking the test?” entered 
first (at step one, F(l, 52) = 15.49, B = -.064, /3 = -.479,p < .01) and “How often did you find 
yourself thinking about how well you were doing while you were taking the test?” entered 
second (at step two, F(2, 52) = 12.64, B = .044, = .363, p < .01). Therefore, this suggests that
defensive pessimists did worse when they also thought more about how difficult the test was as 
they were actually taking the test, while doing better was related to thinking more about how 
well they were doing while they were taking the test.
These posttest questions were intended to measure how often participants had intrusive 
thoughts that may have disrupted their concentration during the test. However, given that the 
relationships between these two questions and percentage correct are in different directions, a
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more likely explanation is that doing worse was related to thinking more about the difficulty of 
the test because the test truly was more difficult for these people (and thus their scores were 
lower). Likewise, it makes sense that the DPs who did better thought more about how well they 
were doing because they actually were doing well, and they could sense this during the test (e.g., 
during the test they may have thought, “These problems are easy and I’m doing great on them!”).
Strategic Optimists
Main Analysis: Reflectivity on Test Performance
A one-way ANOVA of reflectivity condition (Reflection, No Reflection) on strategic
optimists’ percentage of correct answers was not significant, F(l, 33) = 1.25,/? = .272. (Means 
are displayed in Table 2.) Interestingly, although the difference was not significant, the means 
were opposite of the direction predicted: SOs actually performed better when they reflected 
before the test. This is contrary to past research that has shown a decrease in SOs’ performance 
after reflection (Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Sanna, 1998; Showers, 1992; Spencer & Norem,
1996).
Table 2
Strategic Optimists ’ Mean Percentage of Correct Answers by Reflectivity Condition
Reflection No Reflection
Mean 68.26 59.98
Standard Deviation 22.49 21.42
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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A one-way ANOVAs of reflectivity condition on SOs’ responses to the pretest and 
posttest measures was also performed. Their responses to three questions were significantly 
different between the reflectivity conditions: “How often did you find yourself thinking about 
how difficult the test was while you were taking the test?” (Reflection M = 3.47, SD = 1.91; No 
Reflection M= 4.78, SD = 1.48; F(l, 33) = 5.17,p = .030), “How often did you find yourself 
thinking about how well you were doing while you were taking the test?” (Reflection M = 3.00, 
SD = 1.41; No Reflection M = 4.11, SD = 1.57; F(l, 33) = 4.83,p = .035), and “How often did 
you think about what your score would be while you were taking the test?” (Reflection M = 2.88, 
SD =1.41; No Reflection M= 3.89, SD = 1.32; F(l, 33) = 4.75, p - .037). In other words, when 
SOs wrote about their thoughts before the test, they thought less about their performance when 
they were actually taking the test.
Linear Regression to Predict Percentage Correct
As with the DPs, a stepwise linear regression was conducted to see if any of the three 
pretest measures, the seven posttest measures, gender, or GPA could predict the percentage of 
correct answers among SOs. The only variable that entered was, “How often did you find 
yourself thinking about how difficult the test was while you were taking the test?” (F(l, 33) = 
4.25, B = -.041, /3 = -.338, p = .047). Similar to the DPs, SOs who thought more about the 
difficulty of the test during the test were also more likely to have done poorly on the test. 
However, it is interesting to note that SOs’ responses to this same question were also affected by 
which reflection condition they were in (see previous section). SOs who reflected beforehand 
thought less about the difficulty of the test during the test, and thinking less about the difficulty 
of the test was related to scoring higher. Yet the main analysis found no direct effect of
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reflectivity on performance (although performance was higher in the reflection condition, this 
effect was not statistically significant).
Despite the fact that the ANOVA of reflectivity condition on performance was not 
significant, it remains possible that the reflectivity manipulation might have contributed in some 
way to the change in performance caused by frequent thoughts about the difficulty of the test. To 
test this, the reflectivity condition was entered in the first block of a linear regression to remove 
any effect of reflection, followed by the “thoughts about the difficulty of the test” variable (i.e., 
responses to “How often did you find yourself thinking about how difficult the test was while 
you were taking the test?”) in the second block. If the effect of these thoughts on percentage 
correct became non-significant after removing the effect of reflection, then it’s possible that the 
reflectivity manipulation is connected to test performance in some way. Indeed, this is what 
happened: When the effect of reflectivity condition was removed by entering it in the first step, 
the “thoughts about the difficulty of the test” variable was no longer significant when entered on 
the second step, FA(1, 32) - 3.01, B = -.038, /? = -.309,p = .093.
Analysis of Reflections
Since reflectivity did not have a significant effect on the performance of either DPs or 
SOs, it’s possible that the reflectivity manipulation itself was unsuccessful. The instructions in 
the reflectivity manipulation were intended to lead all participants to think about negative 
possibilities before the test, which is supposed to help defensive pessimists and hurt strategic 
optimists (Spencer & Norem, 1996). However, it’s possible that not all participants in the 
Reflection condition were having negative thoughts. Therefore, participants’ reflections were
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coded by categorizing each statement into a specific category, and then it was analyzed how the 
types of statements affected performance.
The content of participants’ reflections was analyzed by counting the occurrence of seven 
types of statements: (1) Negative feelings (statements about a negative emotion participants were 
currently feeling or anticipated they would feel during the test), (2) positive feelings (statements 
about a positive feeling—or absence of a negative feeling—participants were currently 
experiencing or anticipated feeling), (3) negative thoughts (any negatively-charged thought about 
the test, the participants’ expected performance, or the participants’ performance in the past; this 
includes thoughts about the test being difficult, and if they think they would feel bad if they 
failed), (4) positive thoughts (any positive statement about the test or the participants’ 
performance; this includes expecting to do well, thinking the test would be easy, or wondering if 
they could gain personal insight about their test-taking strategies during the experiment); (5) 
“doesn’t matter” thoughts (includes anything suggesting that the test did not matter to them, such 
as because it wouldn’t affect their grades or because they weren’t seniors yet; this also includes 
statements about how they wouldn’t care if they did poorly), (6) hope/effort (any statements 
about hoping to do well or trying one’s best). Most statements were sentences, but in the event 
that one sentence contained two distinct types of statements, each statement was counted (e.g., “I 
would not feel too bad if I did poorly but it would not make me happy,” would count as one 
“doesn’t matter” statement and one negative thought statement).
Examples of each type of statement, taken directly from participants’ actual reflections, 
can be found in Appendix D. The percentage of negative statements (negative feelings plus 
negative thoughts, divided by the total number of statements) were computed, as well as the 
percentage of positive statements (positive feelings plus positive thoughts, divided by the total
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number of statements). Because participants may have written a large number of neutral or 
random statements, these percentages are not the complement of each other and it is important to 
look at them separately. For example, writing five negative statements and five neutral 
statements would lead to a 50% negative statements score and a 0% positive statements score, 
while writing five negative statements and five positive statements would lead to a 50% for both 
the negative and positive statements scores.
As mentioned during the manipulation check, DPs and SOs significantly differed in terms 
of their percentages of negative and positive statements. DPs wrote a higher percentage of 
negative statements (A(l, 42) = 6.18,p = .017), while SOs wrote a higher percentage ofpositive 
statements (F(l, 42) = 8.29, p - .006). This is consistent with the behavior expected from DPs 
and SOs: Only DPs’ reflections should be characterized by a large number of negative thoughts.
For DPs, multiple one-way ANOVAs of the effect of expectancy condition on the six 
individual types of statements, the percentage of negative statements, the percentage of positive 
statements, as well as the total reflection length (number of words) were conducted. The 
expectancy conditions did not significantly predict any of these characteristics of DPs’
reflections.
A stepwise linear regression of the effect of all of the characteristics of participants’ 
reflections (the six types of statements, percentage of negative statements, percentage of positive 
statements, and number of words) on percentage correct was also performed. For DPs, none of 
the characteristics entered the regression as significant predictors of their test performance. For 
SOs, number of words was the only variable to enter the regression equation, F(l, 15) = 7.23, B 
- .003, $ - .570, p = .017. The more SOs’ reflected (or rather, the longer their reflections), the 
better they did on the test.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Observer Expectations and Defensive Pessimists ’ Performance
Norem and Cantor’s (1986b) finding that encouragement or high expectations from an 
observer disrupts defensive pessimists’ performance was not replicated. The results were in the 
right direction, but they did not reach statistical significance. This finding might be due to 
sample size, which was limited due to time constraints and availability of participants.
For defensive pessimists, the effect of an observer’s low expectations is an issue that has 
not been explored until now. There seemed to be a tendency for low expectations to improve 
performance relative to the control (see Figure 2); however, this tendency did not even approach 
statistical significance. If low expectations truly do improve performance, it could be because 
they relieve defensive pessimists from some of the pressure to perform well. This has many 
potential implications, so it is suggested that further research is done with larger samples and a 
more sensitive performance measure to see if low expectations can significantly differ from
controls.
The Effect of Reflectivity: Defensive Pessimists versus Strategic Optimists
The common effect of reflection improving defensive pessimists’ performance and
impairing strategic optimists’ performance was also not replicated. When comparing the effect of 
reflectivity on Control Expectancy defensive pessimists to its effect on all strategic optimists, the
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results were actually found to be in the opposite direction predicted (see Figure 1), although this 
interaction was not statistically significant. In fact, the means were in the opposite direction for 
defensive pessimists in both the Low Expectancy and Control Expectancy conditions. Only in 
the High Expectancy condition did defensive pessimists’ scores improve in the Reflection 
condition, which was predicted (although the improvement was not significant). The results 
could be dismissed as chance findings, but the fact that reflection tended to decrease defensive 
pessimists’ performance in two of the three conditions raises eyebrows. If the sample size had 
been larger and the performance measure more sensitive, it’s possible that these results could 
have reached significance. It would be worthwhile to continue exploring the interaction between 
expectations and reflectivity among defensive pessimists, because it may be that the effect of 
reflectivity is qualified by an observer’s expectations.
Norem and Illingworth (1993) were the first to propose that strategic optimists must 
avoid thinking about a task beforehand in order to do well. The research on this subject has been 
mixed: Spencer and Norem (1996) found that strategic optimists performed better in distraction 
(no reflection) conditions, while Norem and Illingworth (1993, Study 1) found differences in 
strategic optimists’ performance but these differences did not reach statistical significance. 
Sanna’s (1998, Study 3) research on the prefactual thoughts of defensive pessimists and strategic 
optimists demonstrated that when strategic optimists are free to write about their thoughts as they 
naturally occur, they will choose to engage in very little prefactual thinking at all (i.e., they will 
choose not to reflect), compared to defensive pessimists. However, this particular study by Sanna 
focused on how much prefactual thinking they engaged in spontaneously (i.e., when they were 
free to write out their thoughts, as opposed to answering a questionnaire about their thoughts), so
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there was no comparison of strategic optimists’ actual test performance under reflection and no
reflection conditions.
In contrast to the studies that found a difference (e.g., Spencer & Norem, 1996), this 
study found that strategic optimists actually performed better when they had reflected 
beforehand. This tendency was large, but it was not statistically significant. There is certainly a 
need for more research that directly examines the effect of strategic optimists’ reflections (or 
lack thereof) on their performance to test the theory that strategic optimists benefit by not 
reflecting. It may be that the type of reflection will determine whether strategic optimists are 
better off without that reflection. For example, methods such as having them listen to imagery 
tapes that have been preprogrammed by a researcher to be negative, positive, or distracting (e.g., 
Spencer & Norem, 1996) or forcing them to consider negative or positive possibilities by rating 
the likelihood of specific scenarios in a questionnaire (e.g., Showers, 1992, Study 2) may affect 
strategic optimists differently than simply having them list their thoughts (e.g., Norem & 
Illingworth, 1993, Study 1, and my study).
In contrast to Sanna’s (1998, Study 3) results, this study found no differences between the 
actual length of defensive pessimists’ and strategic optimists’ reflections. However, these 
participants wrote for five minutes while Sanna’s participants were told that it would take them 
10 to 15 minutes to write about their performance. Therefore, the short time limit may have 
resulted in a ceiling effect so all participants, regardless of strategy type, reflected equally in the 
five minutes. While there were no differences between defensive pessimists’ and strategic 
optimists’ reflection length, a greater proportion of defensive pessimists’ thoughts were negative 
while strategic optimists had more positive thoughts. However, the valence of defensive 
pessimists’ and strategic optimists’ thoughts was unrelated to their actual performance. For
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defensive pessimists, the reflection condition affected none of the dependent measures and the 
content of their reflections was not related to their performance in any way. There was a slight 
tendency for defensive pessimists in the Low Expectancy and Control Expectancy conditions to 
perform better when they did not reflect, but this was not statistically significant. If it was 
significant, it would raise a very interesting question because it contradicts previous findings that 
reflection improves defensive pessimists’ performance.
For strategic optimists, on the other hand, the reflection condition led them to think less 
about the difficulty of the test while they were taking it, and thoughts about the difficulty of the 
test were related to their actual performance. The reflection condition was able to improve 
strategic optimists’ scores if it caused them to have fewer intrusive thoughts during the test. 
Reflection may have improved strategic optimists’ performance in this study because the test 
might have been more difficult than they expected, and reflecting before the test forced strategic 
optimists to confront the possibility that the test could be difficult. Strategic optimists who did 
not reflect beforehand may have performed worse because the unexpected difficulty of the test 
may have disrupted their focus and composure.
In addition, the length of strategic optimists’ reflections (number of words) entered the 
regression to significantly predict their test scores, while no other characteristics of defensive 
pessimists’ or strategic optimists’ reflections were related to their performance. Considering that 
strategic optimists’ performance was slightly higher in the Reflection condition, this is further 
evidence that reflecting somehow improved strategic optimists’ performance in this study. 
Because none of the specific types of reflection statements entered the prediction equation, they 
cannot explain the mechanism by which reflection improves strategic optimists’ performance. It 
seems that the strategic optimists who took advantage of the reflection task by writing longer
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reflections scored higher. The best explanation for why reflection improved strategic optimists’ 
performance in this study relates back to the frequency of intrusive thoughts about the difficulty 
of the test. For some strategic optimists, reflecting caused them to think less about the difficulty 
of the test as they were taking it, which subsequently helped them score higher. It is important to 
note that this only happened for some strategic optimists (the ones for whom reflecting helped 
them have fewer thoughts about the difficulty of the test), because there was no overall main 
effect of Reflectivity on performance.
Although causality cannot be established, one possible explanation is that it is the 
intrusiveness of these thoughts about the difficulty of the test that disrupted strategic optimists’ 
performance. On the other hand, it might be that these people are already doing poorly because 
the test is too difficult for them, and they realize this and think about it. The effect might also be 
cyclical: These people are having difficulty answering the problems, which makes them think, 
“This test is difficult!” and once they begin thinking about how difficult it is, they start to lose 
their concentration on the test, which causes them to do even worse as a result. The specific 
mechanisms by which reflection affects strategic optimists’ performance is also worthy of further 
study.
It is important to stress that there was no significant effect of reflection improving 
defensive pessimists’ performance, despite the general acceptance of this theory (Norem, 2001) 
and other research supporting it (e.g., Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Spencer & Norem, 1996). If 
the theory is still correct, there are a few possible explanations for why these results are 
inconsistent with it. While the sample size was small, a more important factor may have been the 
adequacy of the manipulations. The selection of defensive pessimists and strategic optimists 
appears to be valid, considering that participants’ reflections were more positive if they were
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strategic optimists and more negative if they were defensive pessimists. Participants were asked 
during the debriefing if they felt defensive pessimism or strategic optimism described them 
better, and the vast majority of participants chose the strategy type they had already been 
classified as. Therefore, the real problem might be the specific methods used.
First, it is possible that the description of the GRE at the beginning of the experiment did 
not lead participants to care about how they would do on the test. If the participants already had a 
grudge against standardized testing or considered these tests a poor measure of intelligence, they 
might have stopped caring about how they would do as soon as the GRE was described as a 
standardized test. It is also possible that they discounted its importance by considering it “just 
part of psychology experiment” and realizing that their score on the test would not affect them in 
any way. Describing the test as a measure of analytical abilities or general intelligence may have 
produced a greater desire to perform well and led to significant performance differences as a 
result. On the other hand, if participants did care about how well they would do, another 
possibility is that the test itself was inappropriate for this study. The analytical test was chosen
instead of a verbal or mathematical test because it was believed that the nature of these
problems—which require slow, careful reading and a step-by-step approach—would make 
performance on them more likely to be disrupted by anxiety. On the other hand, greater 
variability is expected in performance on verbal or mathematical problems, which would hide 
any effect of anxiety. Perhaps analytical problems are predicted by ability just as much as verbal 
and mathematical problems, which could explain why there were no significant differences in 
performance among my conditions. One piece of support for this explanation is that defensive 
pessimists’ year in college was significantly correlated with their scores on the analytical test, r = 
.419, p = .001 (GPA was not, r = -.065, p = .632). Therefore, perhaps the expectancy and
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reflectivity manipulations might have produced significant performance differences if the test 
had been more sensitive to differences in current feelings instead of ability or education (e.g., 
people who have a large vocabulary are going to score higher on a verbal test than people with a 
smaller vocabulary, even if the people with the large vocabulary are feeling more anxious at the 
moment). This is the most likely explanation for the lack of significant results. Unfortunately, the 
sample was also very small (8-10 defensive pessimists per condition) due to time constraints, so 
any effect of the manipulations may have been concealed by the large variability among 
participants’ test scores that is typically found on academic tests. Norem and Cantor (1986b) 
used a tracing-puzzle task in their experiment and they found significant performance differences 
after high expectations. Ability is likely to play less of a role in tracing tasks than in verbal, 
mathematical, or analytical tasks. Norem and Illingworth (1993, Study 1) also found significant 
differences in performance on mental arithmetic problems after reflection, and these types of 
problems—while still likely to be predicted by math ability—are more likely to be affected by 
current anxiety because people will have difficulty holding numbers in their head if they are 
feeling anxious or worrying about their performance. Similarly, Spencer and Norem (1996) used 
a dart-throwing task, which requires attention, concentration, and keeping one’s body still. 
Performance on this type off task could easily be disrupted by anxiety induced by reflecting 
beforehand, and their results suggest that this is what happened. Therefore, it is suggested that 
future research employs performance measures that are mostly affected by anxiety, 
concentration, and working memory so personal ability does not produce too much individual
variability in the results.
Another possible methodological weakness could have been the reflectivity manipulation. 
Spencer and Norem (1996) found an effect of reflection when using guided imagery tapes with a
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positive or negative valence, while others (e.g., Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Showers, 1992) 
found effects when they gave participants a questionnaire that asked them to consider the 
likelihood of specific negative scenarios. The advantage to using a questionnaire is that the 
researcher can manipulate the valence of the statements, and having participants consider 
negative scenarios and negative feelings resembles the type of reflection defensive pessimists 
typically engage in. The participants in this study simply wrote about their thoughts for five 
minutes, so they were free to consider positive or negative events. Strategic optimists’ 
performance is supposed to be disrupted when they engage in negative reflection, but the nature 
of this reflectivity condition did not require their thoughts to be negative. In fact, as the results 
showed, their thoughts tended to be positive. Therefore, it is likely that the effect of reflectivity 
disrupting strategic optimists’ performance was not replicated because the reflection did not 
resemble defensive pessimists’ reflection (in other words, it was not negative). It is suggested 
that future studies use some form of guided reflection to ensure participants’ thoughts will be 
negative in nature.
In summary, the previous effects of reflectivity on defensive pessimists’ and strategic 
optimists’ performance were not replicated, nor was the negative effect of an observer’s high 
expectations on defensive pessimists’ performance. Reflectivity is an essential part of the theory 
of defensive pessimism. Considering that other researchers have found significant effects of 
reflectivity (e.g., Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Spencer & Norem, 1996), the adequacy of the 
manipulations in the present study should be doubted before the accuracy of the theory. If the 
non-significant results were not caused by inadequate manipulations, another possible 
explanation is the small sample size. A quick look at the direction of the means in Figure 2 
commands attention; the direction of defensive pessimists’ average test scores hints at interesting
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effects of observer expectancy and reflectivity that are simply waiting to be revealed. In other 
words, reflection may help or hurt defensive pessimists’ performance depending on what type of 
expectation an observer holds for them, but stronger manipulations and a larger sample size will 
be necessary to better examine this question.
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Appendix A
The Revised Defensive Pessimism Questionnaire 
(Norem, 2001)
When you answer the following questions, please think about how you prepare for and think about 
academic situations. Each of the statements below describes how people sometimes think or feel about 
these kinds of situations. Using the scale below, please indicate on the scantron how true it is of you, in 
academic situations.
1..............................-2------------------------3------------------------4—........................... 5
Not at all Very true of me
true of me
1. I go into academic situations expecting the worst, even though I know I will probably do OK. 
(PESS)
2. I generally go into academic situations with positive expectations about how I will do. (PESS-R)
3. I’ve generally done pretty well in academic situations in the past.a
4. I carefully consider all possible outcomes before academic situations. (REFL)
5. I often worry, in academic situations, that I won’t be able to carry through my intentions. (PESS)
6. I often think about how I will feel if I do very poorly in academic situations. (REFL)
7. I often think about how I will feel if I do very well in academic situations. (REFL)
8. I often try to figure out how likely it is that I will do very poorly in academic situations. (REFL)
9. I spend a lot of time planning when any kind of academic situation is coming up. (REFL)
10. I often try to figure out how likely it is that I will do very well in academic situations. (REFL)
11. In academic situations, sometimes I worry more about looking like a fool than doing really well. 
(PESS)
12. Prior to academic situations, I avoid thinking about possible bad outcomes. (REFL-R)
13. Considering what can go wrong in academic situations helps me to prepare. (REFL)
a “This item is included to differentiate between those who are realistically pessimistic and those who are 
defensively pessimistic, on the assumption that those who report having done very badly in the past are 
realistic when they anticipate doing badly in the future. In college student samples, typically fewer than 
20% of respondents rate themselves below 5 [on a 7-point scale] on this item.” (Norem, 2001, p. 83)
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Appendix B 
Sample Problem
GRADUATE RECORD EXAMINATION 
Analytical Section Practice
In a laboratory study, 160 rabbits in an experimental group were injected with Serum D, 
while 160 rabbits in a control group were injected with a harmless sugar solution. Within 
two weeks, 39% of the experimental group rabbits had contracted jungle fever, a highly 
contagious and usually fatal disease. Therefore, jungle fever must be caused by some 
substance similar to the substances found in Serum D.
The above argument would be most greatly strengthened if it were shown that
(A) the normal rate of jungle fever among rabbits is .01%
(B) 40% of the rabbits in the control group had also contracted jungle fever within two 
weeks
(C) Serum D contains substances extracted from the root of a certain poisonous wildflower
(D) the blood of jungle fever victims invariably contains a high level of certain toxic 
substances also found in Serum D
(E) nearly all the rabbits who contracted jungle fever died within two days of the 
appearance of the first symptoms
Answer: D
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Appendix C 
Analytical Test
Selected from:
The Princeton Review. (2001). Cracking the GRE (2002 ed.). New York, NY: Princeton Review 
Publishing, L.L.C.
#1 - The greater the number of autonomous departments in a government, the more essential is a high level of cooperation. This 
is because increased numbers of autonomous departments demand a larger number of specialized policy makers, which leads to a 
greater burden on administrators and, possibly, to a greater number of difficulties in setting a general policy.
There are always greater numbers of autonomous departments in democratic governments than in centralized governments.
Which of the following statements must be true if all of the statements above are true?
A) Difficulties in setting general policy occur more often in centralized governments than in democratic governments
B) There are more specialized policy makers in centralized governments than in democratic governments.
C) A high level of cooperation is more essential in democratic government than in centralized governments.
D) An administrator’s job is easier in a democratic government than in a centralized government.
E) Autonomous departments operate with greater efficiency in democratic governments than in centralized governments.
Answer: C
#2 - Critics have recently called into question the authenticity of a painting, long believed to be the work of a famous artist, 
which they believe may have been executed by one of the artist’s assistants. In order to determine the painting’s authenticity, its 
visual patterns were compared to those in five works known to have been painted by the artist. Many patterns were examined, 
including composition and the prominence and width of brush strokes. The patterns displayed by the work in question were very 
similar to those in the five genuine works, thereby establishing the authenticity of the sixth painting.
Which of the following, if true, gives the strongest support to the conclusion above?
A) The visual patterns displayed by different painters are not likely to be similar.
B) Painters from different schools sometimes use the same composition and patterns of brush strokes, but do so to achieve 
different effects.
C) Many painters endeavor to change their visual patterns with each painting, so as not to grow stale.
D) The stock of visual patterns from which all painters draw is surprisingly limited, thereby insuring some overlap among 
the patterns displayed by different artists.
E) Composition is not a reliable indicator of a painting’s authenticity.
Answer: A
#3 - Medical researchers have recently suggested that candidates for heart bypass surgery actually achieve similar benefit by 
adopting a regimen of increased exercise and dietary changes, if maintained for a ten-year period. Although bypass surgery is 
now considered a relatively routine procedure, it still puts the patient at risk for heart failure during, or immediately following, 
the operation. Therefore, the performance of bypass surgery should be ceased.
Which of the following, if true, casts the most serious doubt on the conclusion drawn above?
A) Patients undergoing bypass surgery can suffer aneurysms, stroke, or other potentially life-threatening afflictions.
B) Almost all candidates for bypass surgery who do not alter their diets are at a significant risk of suffering a heart attack 
within five years.
C) Although patients who undergo bypass surgery are often at risk for suffering heart attacks during or after the operation, 
most patients survive the procedure.
D) Since the occurrence of heart attacks during and immediately following bypass surgery is rare, more people benefit 
from the surgery than are harmed by it.
E) A regimen of exercise and dietary changes can be undertaken at little cost, whereas bypass surgery is an expensive 
procedure.
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Answer: D
#4 - Last winter in a certain national forest one-sixth of the black bear population was unable to find appropriate dens for 
hibernation. This is somewhat curious given the fact that during the same period, the summer animals that had inhabited the dens 
during the autumn months had migrated. Many of the dens were large enough to accommodate the bears and were well insulated 
against the harsh winter weather.
Which of the following statements, if true, would best explain why the black bears were unable to find appropriate places to 
hibernate when there were ample dens available?
A) Most of the dens which were left vacant were in the higher parts of the forest region and were therefore inaccessible to 
the bears who inhabit the lower region.
B) During the winter, a few black bears continue to live in dens which they inhabited during the autumn months.
C) Many of the dens are not conducive to the rearing of small cubs.
D) A very few of the black bears migrate to a nearby animal preserve during the winter and therefore do not need to find 
dens within the national forest.
E) The number of forest rangers who help the black bears to find dens for hibernation has been cut drastically in the last 
year.
Answer: A
#5 - Although I just had service performed on my car’s engine, it is still not running well. During the service, the timing belt was 
replaced, and the fuel filter was checked and found to be sound. So the problem with the engine cannot be the timing belt or the 
fuel filter. Most cars of the same model and year as mine have experienced either timing belt slippage or water pump failure. 
Therefore, the problem with mv engine must be a failing water pump.
The two underlined statements serve which of the following functions?
A) The first statement provides a context for the argument, and the second statement serves as a premise supporting the 
main conclusion.
B) The first statement is a premise that supports an intermediate conclusion, and the second statement is the main 
conclusion of the argument.
C) The first statement is an intermediate conclusion that is refuted by the main conclusion, and the second statement is the 
main conclusion of the argument.
D) The first statement is an intermediate conclusion that supports the main conclusion, and the second statement is the 
main conclusion of the argument.
E) The first statement is the main conclusion of the argument, and the second statement is an intermediate conclusion that 
supports the main conclusion.
Answer: D
#6 - Johnstone contended that employee-owned companies would invariably be less productive than privately owned enterprises. 
Each individual, recognizing that his fellow employees would be working harder out of a sense of proprietorship, would be 
tempted to lighten his own workload. If each person follows this reasoning, overall productivity would greatly decrease. 
However, a study comparing 15 companies that had recently become employee-owned and 34 privately-owned companies 
revealed significantly better performance from the employee-owned companies.
The answer to which of the following questions would be most useful in evaluating the significance, in relation to Johnstone’s 
claim, of the study described above?
A) Did any of the companies studied switch from private to employee ownership in the middle of the fiscal year?
B) Did investors assess employee-owned companies more favorably than they assessed privately owned companies?
C) Were the employee-owned companies performing as well as the privately owned companies before they switched 
ownership to their employees?
D) Were the employees of the employee-owned companies that were studied paid at least as much as the employees of the 
privately owned companies?
E) Were there significant overlaps in the market interests of the employee-owned and privately owned companies?
Answer: C
For#s 7, 8, 9:
A fugue written for six instruments—bass, cello, flute, oboe, piano, and violin—calls for them to enter one by one into the 
composition. The instruments must enter according to the following conditions:
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The piano enters fourth.
The cello enters immediately before the violin enters.
The bass enters sometime before the piano enters and sometime before the oboe enters.
The flute enters sometime before the oboe enters.
#7 - Which of the following is an acceptable order, from first to last, in which the instruments could enter?
A) Bass, cello, violin, piano, flute, oboe
B) Bass, flute, oboe, piano, violin, cello
C) Bass, oboe, flute, piano, cello, violin
D) Flute, cello, violin, piano, bass, oboe
E) Flute, cello, violin, bass, piano, oboe
Answer: A
#8 - If the bass enters third, which of the following must be true?
A) The flute enters first.
B) The flute enters second.
C) The oboe enters fifth.
D) The violin enters second.
E) The violin enters sixth.
Answer: D
#9 - If the violin enters sixth, which of the following can be true?
A) The bass enters third.
B) The cello enters second.
C) The flute enters first.
D) The flute enters fifth.
E) The oboe enters second.
Answer: C
For#s 10,11,12:
A reading group is to choose exactly four books to be read by the group over the summer. The four books must be selected from 
among seven eligible books: three nonfiction works—P, Q, and R—and four fiction works—T, U, V, and W. The four books 
must be selected according to the following conditions:
If either Q or R is selected, the other must also be selected.
T and U cannot both be selected.
Q and V cannot both be selected.
#10 - Which of the following could be the four books selected by the reading group?
A) P,Q,R,V
B) P, Q, U, W
C) P, U, V, W
D) Q,T,U,W
E) T, U, V, W
Answer: C
#11 - If P and T are both selected, which of the following pairs of books could be the other books selected?
A) Q and U
B) QandW
C) RandV
D) UandV
E) VandW
Answer: E
#12 - If R is selected, which of the following CANNOT be selected?
A) P
B) Q
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C) T
D) V
E) W
Answer: D
For #s 13,14,15:
A window dresser is designing a hat display for the window of a haberdasher. The display must include one of each of the 
following five types of hats: fedora, derby, top hat, sombrero, and beret. One hat will be displayed each day of a week, Monday 
through Friday. One of the hats displayed must be red, one must be cobalt, one must be brown, one must be white, and one must 
be gray. In designing the display, she has made the following decisions:
The derby will be displayed on an earlier day than the top hat.
The beret will be displayed on an earlier day than the fedora.
The white hat will be displayed on an earlier day than the gray hat.
The cobalt hat will be displayed on Wednesday.
The top hat displayed will be brown.
#13 - Which of the following could be the colors of the hats displayed on Monday through Friday, respectively?
A) White, brown, cobalt, red, gray
B) Red, cobalt, white gray, brown
C) Red, brown, cobalt, gray, white
D) Cobalt, gray, white, brown, red
E) Brown, gray, cobalt, red, white
Answer: A
#14 - Any of the hats could be displayed on Wednesday EXCEPT the
A) Fedora
B) Derby
C) Top hat
D) Sombrero
E) Beret
Answer: C
#15 If the fedora is displayed on an earlier day than the cobalt hat, which of the following must be true?
A) The fedora is displayed on Monday.
B) The derby is displayed on Tuesday.
C) The top hat is displayed on Friday.
D) The sombrero is displayed on Wednesday.
E) The beret is displayed on Monday.
Answer: E
For#sl6,17,18:
A professor must decide which of seven graduate students—Jason, Katrina, Ling, Mitch, Nikita, Otto, and Pinter—to invite to a 
special seminar. Any combination of students is acceptable, but the following conditions must be met:
If Jason is invited, Katrina must be invited.
If Katrina and Mitch are both invited, Nikita cannot be invited.
If Mitch and Ling are both invited, Nikita cannot be invited.
If Ling is invited, either Otto or Pinter must be invited.
Nikita or Otto, but not both, must be invited.
Otto and Pinter cannot both be invited.
#16 - Which of the following is an acceptable group of students to invite?
A) Jason, Katrina, and Pinter
B) Mitch, Otto, and Pinter
C) Katrina, Nikita, and Otto
D) Mitch, Ling, and Otto
E) Mitch, Ling, and Nikita
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Answer: D
#17 - If Ling and Pinter are both invited, which of the following is true?
A) Mitch must be invited
B) Otto must be invited
C) Nikita must be invited
D) Jason cannot be invited.
E) Katrina cannot be invited.
Answer: C
#18 - If Ling and Nikita are both invited, which of the following must be false?
A) Pinter is invited.
B) Mitch is invited.
C) Jason is invited.
D) Otto is not invited.
E) Katrina is not invited.
Answer: B
For#sl9,20,21:
In a corporation, there are seven divisions—A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. These divisions send mail to each other in two ways: by 
messenger and by fax.
Mail sent by messenger can travel in only one direction, from A to B, from B to D, from D to F, from F to G, and from G to A. 
Mail sent by fax can travel in either direction between B and C, between C and G, and between D and E.
The seven divisions cannot send mail by any other means.
Mail that cannot be sent directly to the desire division is passed through one or more intermediate divisions, which pass the mail 
along according to the conditions stated above.
#19 - If division D sends mail to division C so that it passes through the fewest possible intermediate divisions, then which of the 
following must be the order of the intermediate divisions through which the mail passes?
A) F, G, A, B
B) F,B
C) F,G
D) B, C
E) F.G.A
Answer: C
#20 - Mail sent from the first to the second division in which of the following pairs can be sent using exactly one intermediate 
division?
A) AtoF
B) CtoA
C) DtoB
D) EtoC
E) GtoE
Answer: B
#21 - Mail sent from the first to die second division in which of the following pairs requires using both the messenger and the 
fax?
A) AtoF
B) CtoG
C) DtoC
D) EtoD
E) GtoB
Answer: C
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#22 - On the basis of a study it conducted, a research group concluded that managers in division A of a certain company 
authorize more discretionary spending than do managers in division B. These conclusions are based on an analysis of the number 
of non-budgeted expense reports that each manager approved.
The statistics used by the group will not be useful as a measure of which division spends more on non-budgeted expenses if 
which of the following is true?
A) The group counts each expense report equally, regardless of the dollar value of the report.
B) The group records all expenses, including those made by the managers themselves.
C) Most expense reports submitted to managers for approval are in fact approved.
D) Most non-budgeted expenses are incurred by the managers themselves.
E) All non-budgeted expense reports are subject to approval by someone who works for neither division.
Answer: A
For #s 23, 24, 25:
Seven foods—A, B, C, D, E, F, and G—are to be chosen for the creation of a menu which is to include either three or four foods. 
A, B, C, and D are hot foods, and E, F, and G are cold foods. There must be at least one hot food and at least one cold food on the 
menu, but there cannot be an equal number of hot and cold foods. The entree on the menu must be a food whose temperature is 
not the temperature of the majority of the other foods on the menu. The following conditions must also be met:
If A is on the menu, then D cannot be on the menu.
If B is on the menu, then E cannot be on the menu.
D and F cannot be on the menu unless they are both on the menu.
If G is on the menu, then E must be on the menu.
#23 - Which one of the following represents an acceptable menu?
A) A, B, C
B) C,E,G
C) D,F,G
D) A, C, D, F
E) B, D, E, F
Answer: B
#24 - If B is on the menu, which one of the following must be true?
A) There are three foods on the menu.
B) There are four foods on the menu.
C) B is the entree on the menu.
D) D is the entree on the menu.
E) F is the entree on the menu.
Answer: E
#25 - Which one of the following could NOT be the entree on the menu?
A) C
B) D
C) E
D) F
E) G
Answer: E
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Appendix D
Examples of Reflection Statements
Negative feelings
“I might be a little nervous while taking the test because I know that I am not a very good test taker...” 
“However, I may become flustered or frustrated if I fid the questions difficult.”
“I am worried I am going to be asked questions I cannot answer.”
“I am really nervous about what is going to be asked of me.”
“I am very scared about what kind of question I am going to see during the test.”
Positive feelings
“I think that I will feel fairly calm while taking the test.”
“.. .so I guess it’s good that I am not that nervous.”
“I currently feel no pressure.”
“.. .but I am still not worried about it.”
“I’m not really nervous about it, and I don’t even know if I will get the results back.’
Negative thoughts
“If I did poorly, I would feel a great sense of loss and not understand why I have so much trouble taking 
standardized tests.”
“I hope there is not math on this test.”
“The worst possible outcome of taking this test is not knowing any of the answers and failing it because 
that would make me feel embarrassed and pretty stupid.”
“During this test I think that I will lose concentration because I will be thinking about the time and how 
hard this is.”
“I do not feel too confident now, so I wonder how I will perform.”
“I would feel awful if I did poorly on the test.”
Positive thoughts
“Maybe it will help me be a better test taker if it reveals my strengths and weaknesses.”
“I am generally a proficient test taker, so I guess we’ll see how this goes.”
“If I do well on this test, I will be happy, and confident about my performance.”
“If it was going okay, I would definitely relax.”
“There is no “worst outcome”.”
“I think that I have a pretty good handle on test taking, generally, when I know the material, I have no 
problem with tests.”
“I think that I will do fairly well though, if the problems are based on logic, because I have a fairly 
analytic mind and am able to think things through pretty well.”
“The worst possible outcome I suppose is if I get no questions correct on the test, but I don't think that 
this will be happening, because I tend to do pretty well on tests, like I said.”
Subset: “...will have no effect...” “don’t care” “wont feel bad if I do poorly”
“I guess it might be a good thing that I will never have to take this test, because I will not need any further 
schooling past my four years in undergraduate school.”
“.. .yet this still isn’t a truly big deal since the test is geared for college graduates.”
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“Hopefully, I will know some, but it won’t be bad if I do not.”
“If I do poorly then I will be okay with it because that is why I am in college, to learn about the things 
that are on this test.”
. .but on the other hand, my score doesn’t really count or mean anything, other than just for this 
experiment.”
“So if I do not score well I will not really care.”
“But I didn’t prepare or even anticipate taking this test so it shouldn’t really matter.”
“.. .and I know that if I do bad on this it won’t hurt me in any way.”
Neutral
“I have heard that this test is similar to an amped up version of an SAT test, so I would assume a lot of the 
same stereotypes could be applied.”
“I think the test will have various questions concerning applications of problem solving, and
mathematical figures.”
“Sometimes, if it is a longer question, I might draw a picture or make some side notes to keep my focus 
on the main idea.”
“I don’t think I really have a feeling one way or the other on the test which could just be a result of my 
lack of sleep and inability to concentrate right now.”
“Will it be really challenging or will it come easily to me?”
Random
“But you can’t measure intelligence, it’s so hard.”
“Critical thinking is a skill that does not come from a textbook, or from a professor lecturing.” 
“Has it been 5 minutes yet?”
“Okay I just want to wait for the few minutes remaining.”
“Actually I bet I’m probably not even going to take a test and I’m just being tested on how people 
anticipate tests.”
“I woke up this morning having to urinate at five thirty AM.”
“I have decided to cut back on my "partying" because I am entering the Army soon.”
“.. .but I will do my best and hopefully do well.”
“.. .it’s not a big concern, though I want to do well.”
“I hope I do not do worse than is expected.”
“.. .even if I started to get frantic I think I would still try to focus and probably do alright because 
adrenaline sometimes helps me...”
“I hope I do well, regardless.”
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